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Notes
OF TREATIES AND TORTURE:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT CAN
RESTRAIN THE EXECUTIVE
JEFFREY C. GOLDMAN
INTRODUCTION

1

The Bush administration’s original (and now superseded)
“torture memos” strain contemporary understandings of the United
States’ obligations under the Convention Against Torture.2 These
documents also mock traditional understandings of the relationship
between international law and treaties and of the executive’s power
to interpret and apply them.3 Perhaps most alarming are the
administration’s attempts to undermine the spirit of both domestic
legislation and international law by employing a “strict
constructionist” interpretive methodology while embracing an
expansive view of executive power. The Bush administration’s
Copyright © 2005 by Jeffrey C. Goldman.
1. The topic for this Note was inspired by an article written by Professors Derek Jinks and
David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97
(2004), which concludes, in answer to its title, that the president is so bound.
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S 85 (entered into
force June 26, 1987; entered into force for the United States Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture].
3. See Memorandum re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A,
from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
General 2 (Dec. 30, 2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (superseding the
August 2002 memorandum, interpreting the definition of torture, and reiterating “the
President’s unequivocal directive that U.S. personnel not engage in torture”); Memorandum re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 1–2 (Aug. 1,
2002) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogation
memo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Standards of Conduct for Interrogation] (expounding the
criminal definition of torture and concluding that torture may be permitted in the War on
Terror under the president’s war-conducting authority or justified by necessity).
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approach weakens American law’s carefully constructed system of
checks and balances by aggrandizing power to the executive branch at
the expense of both coordinate branches.
Short of impeaching the president and removing him from
office—a drastic step that is likely to be both politically unpopular
and ineffective in restoring the country’s reputation as a leader in
human rights issues—what other avenues exist for restraining the
executive? This Note argues that the Supreme Court should take a far
more activist approach in reviewing executive interpretation of
international law and that it may do so while remaining consistent
with judicial precedent. In particular, this Note focuses on the
administration’s conduct of the War on Terror and specifically on its
application of, or threats to use, torture. It concludes that the
president does not, in fact, have the power to terminate unilaterally
the Convention Against Torture because treaties that embody human
rights norms (especially peremptory norms like torture) are
fundamentally different from other sorts of treaties.4
The interplay of traditional and contemporary understandings of
international law—especially customary international law and
peremptory norms—combined with well-established interpretations
of the treaty power suggest that the balance of power between the
executive and judicial branches should vary with the subject matter of
a treaty. True, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit did state, in Goldwater v. Carter,5 that “[t]here is no
judicially ascertainable and manageable method of making any
6
distinction among treaties on the basis of their substance.” However,
the development of international humanitarian and human rights law
in the twentieth century, and especially in the twenty-five years since
Goldwater was decided, suggests otherwise.
The recognition of some rules of international law as peremptory
norms from which no derogation is permitted (jus cogens) provides a
7
“judicially ascertainable and manageable method” of distinguishing
treaties based on subject matter. These treaties provide the Supreme

4. As an aside, the arguments advanced in this Note would likely also apply to
presidential statements purporting to interpret legislation implementing human rights treaties.
Such application, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
5. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
6. See id. at 707 (concluding that the president could unilaterally terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in accordance with the treaty’s terms).
7. Id.

042706 03__GOLDMAN.DOC

2005]

5/23/2006 8:44 AM

OF TREATIES & TORTURE

611

Court with legitimate, constitutional reasons to overrule
congressional and executive treaty interpretations. Although U.S.
courts long ago adopted a rule of construction that accorded treaties
8
and statutes equal weight, jurists added a caveat: “[u]nless it is for
some reason distinguishable from other laws, the rule which [a treaty]
gives may be displaced by the legislative power, at its pleasure.”9
Treaties dealing with peremptory norms are categorically
different from other treaties. Human rights treaties, and related
implementing legislation, grant specific and far-reaching rights
directly to individuals. These rights, by virtue of reason, should be
held by courts as equal to constitutional freedoms and rights; like
those freedoms and rights, neither the executive nor the legislative
branch should be able to alter or infringe them in any but the most
compelling circumstances (and certainly not unilaterally, as by
executive order). The Supreme Court’s recognition of this
equivalence would give it an axe to wield that it cannot carry into
interpretative battles regarding other treaties.10 This axe can restore
the balance of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches and ensure that the United States, which has led the world
in recognizing and promoting human rights, retains its high moral
ground.
This Note argues that because human rights are fundamental in
nature, and because the exercise of constitutional rights is predicated
on the enjoyment of more basic human rights, courts should treat
human rights treaties differently than other international agreements
the United States has signed or ratified. Part I of this Note reviews
the judiciary’s understanding of the relationship between

8. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (holding
that a congressional act granting preferences on hemp imported from India superseded a treaty
granting most-favored-nation status to Russia because “[t]here is . . . nothing in the mere fact
that a treaty is a law, which would prevent congress from repealing it”); see also Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 547–50 (1884) (discussing Congress’s power to override a treaty
with legislation, but disfavoring implied abrogation of treaties); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(1)(a) (1987) (“An act of Congress supersedes . . . a provision of an
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the
earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled.”).
9. Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785 (emphasis added).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power “[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”);
Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785 (“Ordinarily, treaties are not rules prescribed by sovereigns for the
conduct of their subjects, but contracts, by which they agree to regulate their own conduct.”).
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international and domestic law. It then presents a brief overview of
jus cogens norms in international law and demonstrates that torture
has entered the canon of such norms. Part II begins with a discussion
of the function and interpretation of treaties under U.S. law and
argues that human rights treaties should be categorically
distinguished from those dealing with other subjects. It then argues
that equating human rights with constitutional rights is both
appropriate and necessary if human rights treaties are to achieve their
full potential. Part III suggests a limit for the executive’s treaty
interpretation power and specifically demonstrates that executive
power to terminate treaties unilaterally does not extend to human
rights treaties. Part III then argues that recognizing human rights
treaties as a distinct category offers the judiciary a way to restrain the
executive without running afoul of the political question doctrine.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEREMPTORY NORMS, AND TORTURE
This Part examines the relationship between international law,
peremptory norms, and torture. Section A describes the history of
U.S. courts’ recognition of international law and the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the relationship between domestic and international
law. Section B defines jus cogens (peremptory) norms and their place
in the international law hierarchy and establishes torture as a jus
cogens norm.
A. Recognition of International Law by U.S. Courts
International law “consists of rules and principles of general
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations . . . [including] some of their
relations with persons.”11 These rules are derived from treaties,
customs, and principles common to major world legal systems.12 This
definition, however, does not explain how U.S. courts have
traditionally treated international law in general, and customary
international law and jus cogens specifically. This Section briefly
describes U.S. jurisprudence regarding international law.

11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 101 (1987); see also Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm (delineating a
commonly accepted list of major sources of international law).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (1987).
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The Framers assumed that the American government would be
13
based on a common law legal system similar to England’s.
According to Professor Michael Glennon, because the English law
embraced principles of both natural and international law, the
Framers intended that the U.S. legal system would embrace these
same principles.14 Courts have generally reached a similar conclusion.
15
An early case supporting this contention is The Paquete Habana,
which dealt with whether fishing boats caught during the SpanishAmerican War should be exempt from capture as a prize of war.16
Speaking for a six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court, Justice
Gray first noted that “[b]y an ancient usage among civilized nations,
beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of
international law,” boats captured in the course of fishing were
exempt from capture.17 After a comprehensive review of the rule’s
history, including a review of English and French law, Justice Gray
declared that this rule “has been familiar to the United States from
the time of the War of Independence.”18 Recounting adherence to the
rule in the “modern” era19 (including by Japan, described as “the last
State admitted into the rank of civilized nations”), Justice Gray
wrote:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . . .
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be,
20
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.

13. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 252 (1990) (“As the
Framers met in Philadelphia to draft the Constitution, they worked against the backdrop of an
American common-law system that had borrowed heavily from that of the English.”).
14. Id. at 251–58 (using case law, English heritage and incorporation, and constitutional
principles to conclude that customary international law is part of U.S. law).
15. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
16. Id. at 686.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 689.
19. Id. at 689–701.
20. Id. at 700.
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21

Concluding that a court “administering the law of nations” must, in
the absence of a treaty on the same subject, judicially discern and
22
apply international law, the court found in favor of the ship owners.
Interestingly, the dissent in The Paquete Habana did not deny
the existence of the international rule cited by the majority. Instead, it
disputed the force of the rule, downgrading it from a law to a mere
matter of comity between nations, “an act of grace, and not a matter
of right.”23 The dissent, however, misconstrued the Court’s earlier
24
25
opinion in Brown v. United States, on which it relied. Contrary to
the dissent’s reading, in Brown, which dealt with confiscation of
enemy property during the War of 1812, Chief Justice Marshall
questioned only the legitimacy and implications of a specific rule of
international law, but did not deny the persuasive authority of
international law in general.26 In fact, the Chief Justice did not
abandon the notion of international law’s persuasive authority on
U.S. courts at all. Earlier in the Brown opinion, he cited international
law for the proposition that “tangible property belonging to an enemy
and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to
be immediately confiscated.”27 Marshall also warned the Court
against interpreting the Constitution to permit what would be
28
generally prohibited under international law.
More than one hundred years later, U.S. courts are still citing
The Paquete Habana. For example, a federal district court recently
cited the case when holding that the court could “not ignore the

21. Technically, the case referred to prize courts, which specifically dealt with the
(wartime) capture of a ship and its cargo at sea.
22. Id. at 708, 711–12, 714 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (reversing the lower court’s decision
that the ships be treated as prizes of war).
23. See id. at 715, 719 (declining to find any such rule of international law and arguing that
international law has no power in itself but rather provides a guide for a nation’s sovereign
power).
24. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
25. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 715–16 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); see Brown, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) at 122–23 (discussing whether a declaration of war automatically confiscates enemy
property or merely gives the sovereign the right to do so).
26. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128–29 (holding that international law does not by its
own force authorize confiscation of enemy property in a time of war but rather gives the
sovereign the right to do so).
27. Id. at 125.
28. See id. (“In expounding that constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be
admitted which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not possess
elsewhere.”).
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29
precepts of customary international law.” Indeed, even the
conservative Rehnquist Court acknowledged that “the domestic law
of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”30 The next Section
of this Note turns to the concept of jus cogens norms—norms
considered to be uniformly binding under international law—and
demonstrates that torture has achieved jus cogens status.

B. Jus Cogens Norms and Torture
Certain norms under international law are deemed to be jus
cogens, or “[c]ompelling law which is binding on parties regardless of
their will and [that does] not yield to other laws.”31 As such, jus cogens
norms should be, and usually are, accorded greater protection than
other rights. A norm cannot be jus cogens unless both the principle
and its universal, binding character are accepted by the international
32
community. Although there is some disagreement at the margins,
prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and apartheid are generally
conceded to be examples of jus cogens norms.33 Torture is recognized
as such a jus cogens norm under both international and U.S. domestic
34
law. Torture is prohibited in all major legal systems and by almost all
international human rights instruments.35

29. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reconciling customary
international law and the Immigration and Nationality Act in evaluating a writ for habeas
corpus), rev’d sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
30. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (limiting application of the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), to a narrow set of claims arising under international law
that does not include a right to be free of arbitrary detention).
31. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 54 & n.54
(Comm. Print 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 55; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. k (1987)
(“Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community as
peremptory, permitting no derogation.”).
34. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. n. The Restatement
includes the prohibition against “torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment” as a customary international law of human rights and notes that although not all
customary human rights norms constitute jus cogens, torture does. Id.; see also Convention
Against Torture, supra note 2.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 reporter’s note 5 (listing
human rights conventions prohibiting torture and noting that “torture as punishment is barred
by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, and [that] confessions of crime obtained by
torture are excluded” by the Fifth Amendment).
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Domestically, the U.S. Senate acknowledged that torture is
prohibited under international law when it gave its advice and
36
consent to ratifying the Convention Against Torture. The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations described the Convention as a
codification of international law and indicated that “[r]atification . . .
[would] demonstrate clearly and unequivocally U.S. opposition to
37
torture.” The Committee believed ratification was “consistent with
long-standing U.S. efforts to promote and protect basic human rights
and fundamental freedoms throughout the world.”38 The Committee’s
comments also suggested that regardless of torture’s peremptorynorm status at the time of the hearing, most of the obligations the
United States assumed when acceding to the Convention were
39
“already covered by existing law.”
At the Senate hearing, substantial evidence was presented that
the Convention Against Torture recognized, rather than created,
international law. For example, Judge Abraham D. Sofaer indicated
that “[i]nternational law already condemns torture[, and i]n that
40
sense, the Convention breaks little new ground.” Testimony before
the Committee also acknowledged that the United States was the
only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council not to have
ratified the Convention.41
Furthermore, U.S. courts have also recognized torture as a
peremptory norm and not just as a domestically legislated
42
prohibition. In the seminal case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “deliberate
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human

36. Convention Against Torture, supra note 2. The Senate’s acknowledgement is not, of
course, conclusive evidence that torture has obtained jus cogens status.
37. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S.
EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE REPORT].
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st
Cong. 7 (1990) (statement of J. Abraham D. Sofaer, legal adviser, U.S. Department of State).
41. Id. at 45 (reprinting the statement of Winston Nagan, chairman, board of directors,
Amnesty International USA).
42. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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43
rights.” Recognizing that “courts must interpret international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists . . . today,” the
court acknowledged that there were “few, if any, issues in
international law . . . on which opinion seems to be so united as the
limitations on a state’s power to torture.”44 And, in discussing whether
the United Nations Charter conveyed individual rights to citizens of
member countries, the court added that “the guaranties include, at a
bare minimum, the right to be free from torture.”45 Interestingly,
Filartiga was decided almost fifteen years prior to the United States’
accession to the Convention Against Torture, supporting the
contention that torture had already achieved the status of a
peremptory, binding norm prior to the Convention.46
As a jus cogens norm, torture deserves greater protection than
other rights—perhaps even greater protection than other
constitutional rights. As discussed in Part II, this heightened
protection suggests a way to distinguish treaties by subject matter.

II. DISTINGUISHING HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
The previous Part established that the U.S. is bound by
international law and that torture is widely recognized as a jus cogens
norm under international law. This Part discusses the relationship
between international and domestic law, focusing on treaties, which
bridge the two legal planes. Section A examines the concept of
treaties and seeks to distinguish between those treaties that are
contractual in nature and those that reflect international law, focusing
on differentiating treaties dealing with international human rights

43. Id. at 878; see id. (finding a right of action in U.S. courts under the Alien’s Action for
Tort (Alien Tort Statute), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for Paraguayan citizens when their alleged torturer
was physically present in the United States); see also Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp.
2d 1244, 1255–56 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (acknowledging that U.S. courts have found torture to be a
jus cogens norm but declining to find a private right of action based on it); GLENNON, supra
note 13, at 265–66 (quoting Filartiga and commenting that the prohibition against torture was
found to be a settled rule of international law and a peremptory norm).
44. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
45. See id. at 882 (providing evidence of the guarantee of freedom from torture as defined
under several multilateral international human rights agreements).
46. See id. at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate
and slave trader . . . an enemy of all mankind.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 702(d) (1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages or condones . . . torture . . . .”); id. reporter’s note 11 (stating that
prohibition of torture is a nonderogable jus cogens norm under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights).

042706 03__GOLDMAN.DOC

618

5/23/2006 8:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:609

law. Section A also reviews U.S. courts’ traditional understanding of
treaties and the relationship between treaties, international law, and
domestic law. Section B equates the substantive rights delineated in
human rights treaties, especially jus cogens norms, with constitutional
rights.
47
At the outset, the looming presence of Goldwater v. Carter
should be acknowledged. In Goldwater, a plurality of the Court held
that a challenge to President Carter’s unilateral termination of a
commercial treaty with Taiwan was a nonjusticiable political
48
question. Although Goldwater has precedential value, its reasoning
should apply only to certain types of treaties. Specifically, this Note
argues that Goldwater’s nonjusticiability rule should apply only to
commercial treaties and should not apply to human rights treaties. As
this Note explains in Section A and further develops in Part III.A,
commercial and human rights treaties can be distinguished on the
basis of purpose (contractual vs. codification) and subject matter
(commercial vs. human rights). These distinctions are crucial in
determining whether nonjusticiability should apply.
A. Methods for Distinguishing Treaties
A treaty is “[a]n agreement formally signed, ratified, or adhered
to between two nations or sovereigns; an international agreement
concluded between two or more states in written form and governed
by international law.”49 A treaty is, essentially, a “contract between
nations” and is usually treated like a contract rather than a legislative
50
act. Madison commented that “[t]he object of treaties is the
regulation of intercourse with foreign nations and is external.”51

47. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
48. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1540 (8th ed. 2004). For purposes of this Note, “treaty”
will generally refer to any international agreement entered into by the United States and will
not be limited to those agreements executed under the president’s Article II authority. See, e.g.,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(defining a treaty as an international agreement between states, “whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”); B.
Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (holding as a treaty, for jurisdictional
purposes, “a compact authorized by the Congress . . . [and] negotiated and proclaimed” by the
president).
50. 87 C.J.S. Treaties § 2 (2000).
51. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 41
(1915) (quoting James Madison at the Virginia Convention of 1788 called to ratify the
Constitution).
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However, although treaties often resemble contracts in form, they can
52
sometimes perform statutory or legislative functions. Such is the case
in the United States, where treaties are considered to be the law of
53
the land. Both contractual and lawmaking treaties are, in general,
considered sources of international law; neither international nor U.S.
domestic law, however, accords all laws equal standing.54 For
example, the consequence of breaching a contract (damages) is quite
different from the consequence for breaking a law (often,
incarceration). In the second half of the twentieth century, U.S.
international agreements typically focused on economic,
transportation-communication, cultural-technical, diplomatic, and
military issues.55
Historically, U.S. courts have interpreted treaties “in the manner
and to the extent [to] which the parties have declared, and not
otherwise.”56 The Supreme Court has no power “to alter, amend, or
add to any treaty, by inserting any clause” because that “would be to
make, and not to construe a treaty.”57 Treaties generally are deemed
to have the same weight as federal law but are not superior to the
58
Constitution.
The remainder of this Section describes the traditional
classification scheme for treaties and suggests an alternate
methodology. The Section concludes by asserting that human rights
treaties can be clearly distinguished from other treaties based on their
subject matter and applies the proposed methodology to prove the
argument. Some treaties that seek to achieve multiple objectives or
that take a comprehensive approach to problem-solving might be
difficult to classify, but this Note is not concerned with such
borderline cases. The classification scheme described in this Note will

52. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 37 (7th rev. ed., 1997) (noting that treaties “can also perform functions . . . carried out by
statutes [or] by conveyances”).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (requiring that treaties, federal law, and the Constitution
be treated as the “supreme law of the land”); see also 87 C.J.S. Treaties § 2 (2000) (same).
54. MALANCZUK, supra note 52, at 38. But see id. at 37–38 (noting that some scholars
believe that only “law-making” treaties should be considered sources of international law and
that “contract-treaties” are not sources of law but merely legal transactions).
55. See LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 16 (1984)
(charting U.S. international agreements from 1946 to 1972 by subject-matter category).
56. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 72 (1821) (interpreting a treaty dealing with ships
captured as war prizes).
57. Id. at 71.
58. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884).
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distinguish the majority of treaties—and can be applied easily to the
Convention Against Torture and most other human rights treaties.
1. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Treaties. Article II
treaties—those negotiated by the president and ratified by the
Senate—are sometimes said to have the force of law only once they
are executed. A treaty can be either self-executing—meaning it has
the force of law once ratified—or non-self-executing—meaning
separate “implementing legislation” must be passed before the treaty
59
has force. Chief Justice Marshall elegantly explained that a treaty
“is . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
60
legislative provision.” At times, distinguishing a self-executing treaty
from one that is not self-executing can be difficult. A four-part test is
often used to distinguish the two, focusing on: (1) the purpose and
objectives of the treaty; (2) the existence of domestic procedures for
direct implementation; (3) the availability of alternative enforcement
mechanisms; and (4) the social consequences flowing from a court’s
decision whether the treaty is self-executing.61
When no implementing legislation has been passed, non-selfexecuting treaties do not create a private right of action under which
62
a plaintiff can state a claim. To avoid infringing on the political
branches’ authority to define crimes and to conduct foreign relations,
courts have invoked non-self-execution to deny claims under
international human rights treaties ratified by the United States.63
Ostensibly, courts’ construction and delineation of treaties in this
fashion serves the purpose of deferring as much as possible to the
express will of the legislative branch and to the executive’s
interpretations of statutes and international commitments.
Yet, it is not at all clear that the self-executing and non-selfexecuting dichotomy was intended to apply to international

59. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reviewing U.S. treaty
obligations and claims arising under treaties and other forms of international law).
60. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
61. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985).
62. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassini, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding the Convention Against Torture to be non-self-executing, and thus concluding that it
created no private right of action).
63. See id. (holding that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not self-executing
and, further, is not intended to be legally binding but rather to be merely evidence of existing
customary international law).
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agreements dealing with subjects like human rights. Although Chief
64
Justice Marshall’s comments in Foster v. Neilson are the source of
this dichotomy, those comments may have been intended to apply
65
only to “contractual” treaties. Marshall stated that “when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political . . . department; and the legislature must execute
66
the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” Although
Marshall emphasized that an international agreement remains
inchoate until enacted by Congress, he prefaced that statement with
the phrase “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract.”67
Foster involved two claimants to the same tract of land: one traced
ownership to a grant when the land was under Spanish possession; the
68
other to a grant once the land came under U.S. control. The former
claimed that the United States was bound by treaty to honor Spain’s
grant to the title holder.69 Marshall parsed the treaty’s language,
holding that it did not automatically confer property rights on those
who received grants when the land was under Spanish control; rather,
such grants were only valid once confirmed by Congress.70
Chief Justice Marshall, ever the savvy diplomat, primarily sought
to avoid a dispute with the political branches that might have been
caused by the Court’s support for a foreign nation.71 Adopting a treaty

64.
65.
66.
67.

27 U.S. 253 (1829).
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. Marshall wrote:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It
does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as
its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power
of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares
a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without
the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.

Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 304–05.
Id. at 315.
Marshall wrote:
After these acts of sovereign [American] power over the [Spanish] territory in
dispute, asserting the American construction of the treaty by which the government
claims it, to maintain the opposite construction in its own courts would certainly be an
anomaly in the history and practice of nations. If those departments which are
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construction that would invalidate actions the federal government
had taken in reliance on a claim of sovereignty over the territory in
question would have been “an anomaly in the history and practice of
72
nations.” Marshall’s decision strengthened the early republic by
consolidating control over what would eventually become a
significant portion of the United States73—and possibly anticipated
and enabled the Manifest Destiny movement which would flourish in
74
the 1840s.
Marshall’s distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties, then, might not reflect an overarching judicial
75
philosophy so much as a convenient fix for exigent circumstances.
Indeed, the Court itself has on occasion rejected Marshall’s
76
dichotomy. For example, in the Head Money Cases, the Court
distinguished between contractual treaties, which conferred no
77
individual rights, and statutory treaties, which did. The Head Money
Cases dealt with the validity of an excise tax on immigrants—a tax

entrusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation . . . have unequivocally asserted
its rights of dominion over a country of which it is in possession, and which it claims
under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not in
its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A question like this respecting
the boundaries of nations, is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal
question . . . .
Id. at 309. Note that the treaty in question is of a contractual, rather than a lawmaking type,
dealing as it does with possession of land—which is immediately recognizable as a real property
transaction.
72. Id. (“If those departments which are entrusted with the foreign intercourse of the
nation . . . have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a . . . possession . . . it is not in
its own courts that [a treaty interpretation taken by the political branches] is to be denied.”).
73. Marshall reached a similar decision, on similar grounds, in the earlier case of Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), in which he held a property claim raised by Indians
invalid because their land was “discovered” by Europeans and “if an uninhabited country be
discovered . . . the country becomes the property of the discoverers,” id. at 595.
74. Manifest Destiny was a nineteenth-century concept that presumed that “the United
States had the right and duty to expand throughout North America.” THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 825 (3d ed. 1993).
75. That Marshall’s judicial approach was pragmatic is not particularly controversial. See,
e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall’s Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 439, 445
(describing and analyzing Marshall’s adjudicative style). As Professor Eisgruber comments:
John Marshall faced the task of demonstrating that crucial and difficult constitutional
questions could be resolved without leaving American politics subject to the
undisciplined play of either legislative or judicial discretion. An important part of
Marshall’s response was tactical . . . . Marshall aggressively took advantage of political
circumstances to deflect attacks upon the Court and to secure useful precedents.
Id.
76.
77.

112 U.S. 580 (1884).
Id. at 598–99.
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that the plaintiffs claimed conflicted with various bilateral treaties.
The Court distinguished between treaties that are merely “compact[s]
between independent nations,” under which courts can provide no
remedy to an injured party, and those that “confer certain rights upon
the citizens” of one party living in the territory of another, which are
“capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts.”79
Thus, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, although long-standing, is not compelled in all instances;
other treaty classification schemes are possible and, indeed, have
been relied on by courts.
2. Subject Matter. If the structure of a treaty—its nature as a
self-executing or non-self-executing instrument—is an inappropriate
basis for determining when a treaty functions as a law and not as a
contract (a distinction critical to knowing how a court should
interpret its breach), what might be a better way to distinguish the
two? The treaty’s subject matter may offer a more useful basis for
distinction.80 Chief Justice Marshall’s dichotomy may be useful for
determining when treaties incidentally or derivatively confer
individual rights, such as “treaties of peace, commerce, [and]
alliance,”81 but only because the essential nature of such treaties is
already obvious (they are contractual). Individual rights are not
necessarily essential to the achievement of these treaties’ aims, and
thus whether such rights are conferred by these treaties is not of
primary importance. The situation, however, is very different with
human rights treaties, which primarily and specifically seek to
acknowledge or imbue individual rights. Analyzing such a treaty as
self-executing (or not) might be academically interesting, but this
approach misses the forest for the trees. An approach that first
considers subject matter would, this Note proposes, be both more
efficient and more effective.
Chief Justice Marshall, however, was not alone in his conception
of the treaty power’s scope and nature. Alexander Hamilton, for
example, believed that treaties had, as their object, contracts with

78. Id. at 597.
79. See id. at 597–99 (concluding that even when a treaty provided private rights such as
those of property or inheritance, an act of Congress that contravened the treaty controlled).
80. MALANCZUK, supra note 52, at 38 (noting that “the only distinction between a lawmaking treaty and a contract treaty” is one of content).
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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foreign nations, and that they did not encompass “rules prescribed by
the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and
82
sovereign.” A jurist who was a contemporary of the Framers
commented, “The power ‘to make treaties’ . . . embraces all sorts of
treaties, for peace or war; for commerce or territory; for alliances or
succors . . . and for any other purposes which the policy or interests of
independent sovereigns may dictate in their intercourse with each
other.”83 Another jurist opined that “[o]rdinarily, treaties are not
rules prescribed by sovereigns for the conduct of their subjects, but
contracts, by which [the sovereigns] agree to regulate their own
conduct.”84 He applied this rationale to hold that congressional
legislation superseded a commercial treaty when a conflict arose
between the two, despite the fact that individual merchants were
inconvenienced by the change.85 However, he qualified this rule of
construction with the caveat that it might be inapplicable when a
treaty is distinguishable from other laws—perhaps alluding to
situations that do in fact prescribe conduct for sovereigns’ subjects.86
Theoretical reinterpretations of history are one thing, but actual
precedent is far more compelling. The Supreme Court itself has, in
87
fact, distinguished a treaty based on subject matter. In United States
88
v. Rauscher, the Court interpreted the Ashburton Treaty to hold
that British defendants extradited to the United States could only be
tried for crimes enumerated in the demand for extradition.89 Of
course, an extradition treaty might not be classified as a human rights
treaty by modern standards. Rauscher, however, is notable for

82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 81, at 450–51.
83. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1502 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833), quoted in HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 41 (1915).
84. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (Curtis, J.)
(holding that Congress may repeal a treaty by enacting relevant legislation).
85. Id.
86. See id. (“There is therefore nothing in the mere fact that a treaty is a law, which would
prevent congress from repealing it. Unless it is for some reason distinguishable from other laws,
the rule which it gives may be displaced by the legislative power, at its pleasure.”).
87. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412 (1886) (“Whether in the United
States, in the absence of any treaty on the subject . . . a State can, through its own judiciary or
executive, surrender him for trial to such foreign nation is a question which has been under
consideration by the courts of this country without any very conclusive result.”).
88. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
89. Id. at 409.
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acknowledging that a treaty’s subject matter, and not its self90
executing nature, granted individual rights.
Rauscher is not the only example of the Supreme Court
distinguishing treaties based on subject-matter classification. For
example, in considering whether certain provisions of the Jay Treaty
of 1794 between the United States and the United Kingdom survived
the War of 1812, the Court unanimously held: “The doctrine . . . that
war ipso facto annuls treaties of every kind . . . is repudiated by the
great weight of modern authority; and the view now commonly
accepted is that ‘whether the stipulations of a treaty are annulled by
91
war depends upon their intrinsic character.’” Specifically, the Court
distinguished treaties “having a political character” from those
dealing with substantive issues, such as possession of property by
nationals, boundary decisions, and “provisions which represent
92
completed acts.” The Court ultimately distinguished treaty articles
vesting rights “permanent in character” which were “by their very
nature . . . fixed and continuing” from those rights which were
“wholly promissory and prospective.”93
3. Human Rights Treaties and the Subject-Matter Distinction.
Applying the distinction between treaties vesting personal and
permanent rights (human rights treaties) and promissory rights
(contractual agreements) to the Goldwater holding, a commercial
treaty (like that in Goldwater) might confer derivative individual
rights, but a human rights treaty clearly implicates rights “permanent
in character.”94 Whereas nations might contract for certain privileges
in a commercial treaty, such that the parties merit the benefits of their
90. Id. at 419. The Court cites the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884), as
precedent for this analysis. In the Head Money Cases, the Court held that
[a] treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice,
that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would
to a statute.
112 U.S. at 598–99.
91. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236 (1929) (quoting 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE,
A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 (1906)).
92. Id. at 236–37.
93. Id. at 239; see also Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding international commercial agreements such as NAFTA nonjusticiable on the
ground that the Constitution clearly delegates authority over “foreign affairs and commerce” to
the political branches).
94. Karnuth, 279 U.S. at 239.
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bargains, to speak of treaties as creating bargained-for privileges of
95
human beings seems offensive. Unfortunately, in modern times,
courts have generally relied on Chief Justice Marshall’s dichotomy
rather than the substance of treaties to determine whether treaties
create individual rights. Sadly for both human rights activists and
potential torture victims, Marshall’s dichotomy quite often has been
applied to human rights treaties. For example, a district court held
that the United Nations Charter was non-self-executing and therefore
did “not vest any of the plaintiffs with individual legal rights.”96
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
97
98
(ICCPR) has been found to be non-self-executing. Specifically
because of their non-self-executing nature, neither the ICCPR nor the
Convention Against Torture were deemed to have created “a private
right of action under which the plaintiff[s could] successfully state a
claim.”99
In applying Marshall’s dichotomy to human rights treaties, courts
have created a quagmire of case law that is replete with exceptions.
For example, in evaluating the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to General Manuel Noriega, a court noted that although
most international treaties have been found to be non-self-executing,
this determination must be made for each treaty individually.100
Finding the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of

95. The fact that certain negotiations, such as whether women are to have equal rights in a
rebuilt Iraq, take place does not detract from the offensiveness of such a discussion. If certain
“truths” (rights) are “self-evident,” as the Declaration of Independence declares, then human
understanding, rather than the nature of the rights themselves, changes.
96. Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C. 1958) (concluding, as a matter of
law, that no cause of action was available under the U.N. Charter for damage caused by atomic
tests conducted by the United States in the Pacific Ocean).
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. I, para. 1, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
98. See, e.g., Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that even
though such treaties are non-self-executing, they have been employed in determining whether
individual rights have been violated), rev’d sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.
2003); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassini, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that
neither the ICCPR nor the Convention Against Torture are self-executing treaties).
99. Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1257; see also Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and
International Human Rights, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 145, 149
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (noting that courts have generally construed human rights
treaties narrowly, and suggesting that “human rights clauses are non-self-executing and hence
not the source of enforceable rights”).
100. United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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101
Prisoners of War (Geneva III) to be self-executing, the court stated
that “it is inconsistent with both the language and spirit of the treaty .
. . to find that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the
102
individual POW in a court of law.” Relying on the purpose of the
Geneva Conventions to justify its conclusion, the court held that it
was not designed “to create some amorphous, unenforceable code of
103
honor among the signatory nations.” Thus, the court held, “if a
treaty expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action, it is
self-executing and can be invoked by the individual.”104 Such a
torturous route to discerning individual rights from a treaty is helpful
neither to individuals seeking protection under U.S. law nor to those
burdened with the laws’ enforcement.
Rather than relying on a structural analysis of whether a treaty is
self-executing, courts should use the content, substance, and purpose
of the treaty to determine whether treaties confer private, individual
rights. Human rights treaties are prime contenders for conferring
private rights based on their content and purpose because “[h]uman
rights conventions address the rights of individuals” by their very
nature.105 This proposal is not unprecedented: as the Noriega court
noted, “[i]t must not be forgotten that the [Geneva] Conventions
106
have been drawn up first and foremost to protect individuals.”
Categorically distinguishing human rights conventions and other
international agreements is not too great a task for the judiciary.
Traditionally, of course, the subjects of international law have been
107
But treaties and other international
states—and only states.
instruments have moved beyond the limited subject matter that the
Framers envisioned, such as trade agreements, military or strategic

101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Chief Justice Marshall’s point in Foster was the reverse, that only if a treaty is selfexecuting does it create individual rights. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
105. Elizabeth L. Larson, Comment, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women:
Action for Equality, Development, and Peace (Beijing, China: September 1995), 10 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 695, 713 (1996).
106. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 799 (quoting INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 23 (J. Picket ed., 1960)).
107. The dictionary, in fact, defines “international law” as “a body of rules that control or
affect the rights of nations in their relations with each other.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 611 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 2001).
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108
alliances, and navigation privileges. “[H]uman rights law . . .
[differs] in that it focuses on the rights of individuals . . . . Because of
this focus on individuals, human rights law necessarily must peer into
109
the domestic laws of nations and into the private spheres of life.”
A functional argument also supports distinguishing human rights
instruments from other kinds of international agreements. The
Convention Against Torture, for example, is neither legislative nor
contractual in nature. Instead, it “codifies international law as it has
110
evolved.” In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
believed that “the majority of the obligations to be undertaken by the
United States pursuant to the Convention [were] already covered by
111
existing law.” Therefore, the Convention Against Torture must
have been ratified for reasons other than to create either contractual
obligations or new legislation, such as to support public policy. For
example, failure to comply with either human rights treaties or
international law norms would weaken the ability of the United
States to impose such norms on other nations.112 Ratifying a treaty
like the Convention Against Torture also bolstered the credibility of
the United States in the human rights arena. In hearings related to
the ratification, one witness told Congress that “[t]he United States
has played a leading role in the development of the major human
rights treaties, but has declined to ratify many of them.”113 Ratifying
the Convention Against Torture signaled that the United States

108. See TUCKER, supra note 51, at 41 (“The object of treaties is the regulation of
intercourse with foreign nations and is external.” (quoting James Madison at the Virginia
Convention of 1788, called to ratify the Constitution)); see also supra text accompanying note
83.
109. Larson, supra note 105, at 713.
110. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
REPORT, supra note 37, at 3 (“The Convention codifies international law.”).
111. Id. at 10. Under the Convention, the United States had to establish personal
jurisdiction for criminal prosecution purposes; this obligation required additional legislation.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 2, art. 4; SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE REPORT, supra note 37, at 10. Later in its report, the
Committee noted that “[a]cts of torture committed in the United States . . . would appear to
violate criminal statutes under existing . . . law.” Id. at 18.
112. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (highlighting policy
reasons for honoring international human rights obligations), rev’d sub nom. Beharry v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
113. Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra
note 40, at 45 (reprinting the statement of Winston Nagan, chairman, board of directors,
Amnesty International); see also id. at 77 (reprinting the written statement of nonprofit
organizations stating their belief that “ratification of the Convention Against Torture would
send an important signal to the world about U.S. concern for human rights”).
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would “practice what it preached.” The signal communicated by
completion of the formal ratification process was especially strong
given the many issues and causes that compete for congressional
attention. A purely symbolic gesture, a court might reason, would not
have been undertaken by either the president or members of
Congress, given the demands on their time. Therefore, the signaling
function might also serve to notify the judiciary that the political
branches intended that the government be held accountable for
violations of the torture prohibition, as embodied in the treaty.
B. Human Rights as Fundamental or Constitutional Rights
Distinguishing human rights treaties from other types of treaties
is also consistent with both historic and modern notions of “rights.”
Arguing that the treaty power granted to the political branches under
the proposed Constitution was similar in its scope and limitations to
that held by the British Crown, Patrick Henry asked rhetorically,
“Can the English monarch make a treaty which [would] subvert the
common law of England, and the constitution? . . . Dare he do
anything . . . subversive of the great privileges[] of his people?” He
then answered himself, “No, sir. If he did, it would be nugatory, and
the attempt would endanger his existence.”114 As John Randolph
Tucker, a nineteenth-century law professor and member of Congress,
said, “A treaty . . . cannot take away essential liberties secured by the
Constitution to the people.”115
Merely because a treaty may not detract from an “essential
liberty,” however, does not mean that human rights treaties confer
116
fundamental rights. Yet such an argument makes sense. After all,
human rights derive from the same source as constitutional rights117—
they are a necessary precondition to a government of free people, by
free people, for free people. Like such judicially recognized

114. TUCKER, supra note 51, at 36 (quoting Patrick Henry at the Virginia Ratification
Convention).
115. Id. at 14.
116. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[I]nternational law
confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments.”).
117. See Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as “Rights,” 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 425,
434 (1979) (“International human rights derive . . . from national rights theories and systems,
harking back through English, American, and French constitutionalism to John Locke . . . and
earlier natural rights . . . theory.”).
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118
constitutional rights as marriage and procreation, human rights
need not be explicitly enumerated. If human rights treaties merely
codify, rather than legislate, human rights derived from such treaties
must be at least as judicially cognizable as nonenumerated
constitutional rights. Furthermore, jus cogens norms ought to be
recognized as a superior kind of right; it is logically inconceivable that
a court would protect the right to marry but turn a blind eye to more
fundamental threats to life and liberty, such as torture.119
Additionally, a ratified treaty can be said to embody the
sovereign will of the United States. But such sovereignty “reside[s] in
the people, for whom the President and the Senate [are] merely
120
agents.” At a minimum, then, human rights treaties should be able
to add to the rights and liberties enjoyed by Americans, similar to the
way in which other kinds of constitutive documents create obligations
and privileges. Rights deemed to be fundamental, of course, include
not only limitations prohibiting certain government actions but also
positive government obligations.121
Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance, until the 1920s, to protect
civil liberties, and its current bent toward strict constructionism, it is
not surprising that the Court has failed to find many positive
obligations created by international human rights agreements.122 But
the Court’s reluctance to do so, and the slow development of
domestic human rights jurisprudence generally, does not mean that
the Court should, or will, turn a blind eye to human rights claims in
the future—especially when such claims arise from treaties.123 States
may be the actors that draft and ratify human rights agreements, but

118. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to marry);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recognizing the right to use
contraception).
119. Although slavery, also prohibited as a jus cogens norm, was embedded in, and perhaps
even essential to the ratification of, the Constitution, the fact that the Framers failed to
completely embody the ideals they drew upon in shaping a new country’s government should
not be used to justify violating an analogous norm two hundred years later.
120. See Caleb Nelson, The Treaty Power and Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor
Woolhandler’s Article, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 801, 807 (2002) (discussing whether unauthorized
treaties can be self-executing).
121. See Henkin, supra note 117, at 434 (discussing notions and kinds of fundamental rights).
122. See Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 99, at 134, 144 (noting that the Supreme Court did not
protect civil liberties until the 1920s, and arguing that the Court has still not dealt with those
issues in the context of foreign affairs).
123. See id. at 140–41 (proposing three situations in which courts could guarantee civil rights
in a foreign affairs context).
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124
Indeed, most
individuals are the intended beneficiaries.
international human rights agreements speak in terms of individual
rights. For example, the ICCPR uses phrases like, “Every human
being has the inherent right to life,” and “Everyone shall have the
right to hold opinions without interference.”125
Additionally, as a matter of policy, viewing international human
rights as individual rights on par with constitutional rights “may in
fact help make it more likely that they will be enjoyed in fact,” as
126
Professor Henkin notes. The alternative view—denying that human
rights are constitutional rights—may well lead society “down a road
where Americans could lose some hard-won liberties,” especially if
the courts automatically reject a claim based on human rights in the
name of security and categorically deem such claims either illfounded or nonjusticiable.127
Finally, as consensus has developed that at least some
international human rights norms—jus cogens norms like torture and
genocide—do guarantee, at a minimum, the right to be free from the
activity prohibited, it is entirely appropriate for courts to recognize
such rights as coequal with constitutional rights.128 In Banco Nacional
129
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, for example, the Court noted that “the
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it.”130
Recognizing jus cogens norms as coequal with constitutional
rights would also be consistent with existing jurisprudence. Further,
such recognition would not run afoul of the Court’s concerns that it
131
would be infringing on the political branches’ spheres of influence.
A bright-line test that recognized jus cogens norms as fundamental,

124. See Henkin, supra note 117, at 431 (discussing the rights and obligations created under
international human rights agreements).
125. ICCPR, supra note 97, arts. 6(1), 19(1).
126. Henkin, supra note 117, at 445.
127. See Dorsen, supra note 122, at 144 (proposing reasons why the Supreme Court has not
dealt with contentions of civil liberties violations in the context of foreign affairs).
128. Id. at 140–41 (suggesting situations in which courts could guarantee civil rights in a
foreign affairs context, including procedural due process and free speech claims).
129. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
130. Id. at 428; see also id. (concluding that the act of state doctrine is applicable even where
international law has been violated and that it applies to expropriation of property of aliens
residing in the United States).
131. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (disclaiming that “every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance”).
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and as equivalent to constitutional rights, would not activate the
political question doctrine because the political branches would have
clear guidelines as to how far their power extended. The Court’s
contention that “the less important the implications of an issue are for
our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the
political branches” would seem to support political-branch
exclusivity, given the important signal proclamation of adherence to
human rights norms sends. Yet, in this context, the government’s
willingness to allow courts to enforce promises made by the political
132
branches may send an even stronger signal.
Finally, treating jus cogens norms as constitutional rights could
expand the class of individuals protected by those norms. Courts
could feel comfortable extending the protection of the United States
not just to American citizens but to anyone whose fundamental
human rights are violated by an American national under the
nationality and territorial principles. Under the nationality principle,
“[a] state may prosecute its nationals for crimes committed anywhere
133
in the world.” Under the territorial principle, “[e]very state [can]
claim[] jurisdiction over crimes committed in its own territory.”134
Although these principles originated with regard to criminal
activities, a strong argument can be made that violations of human
rights constitute criminal acts.135 On a purely domestic level, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that noncitizen residents, even if
136
present on U.S. territory illegally, are entitled to some rights. Surely
fundamental human rights should rank among them.
III. CONSTRAINING THE EXECUTIVE, EMPOWERING THE JUDICIARY
If at least some international human rights are equivalent to
constitutional rights under American law, and if courts are competent
to hear cases arising under human rights treaties, to what extent can
the president modify or terminate human rights treaties? Because of
132. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
133. MALANCZUK, supra note 52, at 111.
134. Id. at 110–11.
135. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal prosecuted Nazis for “crimes against humanity,”
which included enslavement, torture and genocide. See, e.g., id. at 356–61 (describing human
rights prosecutions in general, the Nuremberg Tribunals, and the emergence of the new
International Criminal Court).
136. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 223 (1982) (recognizing that even illegal
aliens are guaranteed due process and cannot be treated as a suspect class), discussed in ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746–47 (2d ed. 2002).
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the unique nature of human rights treaties, the executive branch lacks
the power to violate or abrogate them. Courts, therefore, when
confronted with such an attempt, should not feel constrained by the
political question doctrine but rather should step forward to protect
individual rights. Further, courts should construe treaty
interpretations or modifications as unconstitutional when inconsistent
with binding international law. Under this theory, the president
cannot unilaterally abrogate a human rights treaty or, at most, can
only abrogate those treaties not dealing with jus cogens norms. Nor
can the executive promulgate an interpretation of a treaty that is
inconsistent with international law. In other words, human rights and
related treaties can constrain the executive and empower the
judiciary.
A. Limitations on the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Powers
This Section contends that the president is not solely responsible
for international affairs, suggests some limitations on the president’s
ability to interpret and execute treaties, and shows that the president
lacks the power to abrogate human rights treaties codifying jus cogens
norms.
1. The President Is Not Solely Responsible for International
Affairs. Although the Constitution can be read as vesting the
president with “primary constitutional authority over the conduct of
foreign affairs,”137 the president is not the “sole organ” of foreign
affairs and does not wield a “blank check in the area.”138 True, the
president might be viewed as the center of power for actions touching
139
on “relations and intercourse with other countries,” but human
rights treaties, because they confer individual rights, do not implicate
“intercourse” with other nations.
140
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. is commonly cited
as supporting the theory of presidential dominance in foreign

137. H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529 (1999).
138. See DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES
93 (1986) (arguing that the Framers did not vest the president with the exclusive power to make
treaties).
139. Powell, supra note 137, at 555 (quoting MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)).
140. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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141
affairs. The Court commented there that “the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation” and
referred to the president’s “exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of
142
the federal government in the field of international relations.” Yet,
Curtiss-Wright dealt with whether Congress could delegate authority
to the president to prohibit munitions sales to certain countries, not
143
with treaty modification or abrogation. Of the several categories
into which foreign affairs powers can be divided, Curtiss-Wright most
obviously implicates the recognition and international advocacy
powers.144 Conceptually, the arms sales policy was either related to
recognition of governments involved in the Paraguayan-Bolivian war
or was part of the United States’ overall foreign policy objectives.145

2. Limitations on the President’s Ability to Interpret and Execute
Treaties. Still, the president’s foreign relations powers surely include
those of negotiating and executing treaties, which necessarily involve
some interpretation.146 Nevertheless, the treaty power has never been
understood to be unlimited. Hamilton believed that both the
Constitution and “natural principles” limited the treaty power—as
they did for every other delegated power.147 Indeed, regardless of the
executive’s views on the subject, a congressional act that modifies,
contravenes, or repeals a treaty following its entry into force is
controlling.148 In Whitney v. Robertson,149 for example, the Supreme
Court held that a commercial treaty is equivalent to any other statute

141. See id. at 316–19 (discussing the domestic and foreign powers of the political branches).
142. Id. at 319–20.
143. Id. at 322–27.
144. See Powell, supra note 137, at 555, 556, 564 (suggesting the division of the president’s
foreign affairs powers into the powers of recognition, negotiation, treaty-making, international
advocacy, and national security).
145. See SANDRA BAO ET AL., LONELY PLANET, ARGENTINA, URUGUAY & PARAGUAY
664 (4th ed. 2002) (providing a brief history of the Chaco War and suggesting the involvement
of oil companies to secure exploration rights in South America).
146. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Legislative Provision Regarding ABM Treaty, 20 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 246, 248 (1996) (“It belongs exclusively to the President to interpret and execute
treaties. This is a direct corollary of his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care’ that the laws
are faithfully executed.”).
147. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1092 (1985) (describing Hamilton’s view on the
limits of the treaty power).
148. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) (“The duty of the courts is to
construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will.”).
149. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
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and applied the maxim of lex posterior derogat priori—a later statute
150
repeals an earlier one. Although the executive’s interpretation of a
treaty carries great weight, it certainly is not controlling151 because
Congress can check the executive branch’s interpretation through
legislative action. Likewise, the judicial branch should be able to
gainsay the executive’s interpretation of a treaty, especially if
152
constitutional-level rights, such as human rights, are infringed. Put
another way, if the executive “cannot make a treaty contrary to the
constitution,” neither should it be able to interpret a treaty in a way
that opposes the Constitution or that “take[s] away essential
liberties.”153
3. Checking the Power to Abrogate Treaties. If the executive
cannot “interpret away” individual rights, could it simply abrogate or
terminate a human rights treaty? The issue of unilateral treaty
termination by the president has never been satisfactorily resolved,
but it has occupied the attention of many legal scholars.154 Unilateral
termination has sometimes been justified under the theory that it
does not create any obligations for the United States but merely
brings obligations to an end.155 Yet estoppel might be raised as an
argument against unilateral termination with regard to those treaties
156
that implicate contractual rights. Similarly, human rights treaties,

150. See id. at 194 (applying the principle without articulating it in exactly the same terms).
151. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913) (“A construction of a treaty by the
political department of the Government, while not conclusive upon a court . . . is nevertheless of
much weight.”). But cf. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (accepting the
argument that a controlling executive act preempts existing customary international law).
152. The executive branch, of course, can balance such judicial power by controlling judicial
appointments, with the help of the Senate. Congress may be able to protect against excessive
judicial aggrandizement through the impeachment process.
153. TUCKER, supra note 51, at 14, 37 (quoting George Mason and John Randolph Tucker,
respectively, on the limits of the treaty power as extrapolated from similar limits on the British
Crown).
154. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CAL. L. REV. 643, 658, 660 (1937) (noting a
long-standing controversy over the issue of unilateral treaty termination, and concluding that
the “logical view” is that treaty termination should be accomplished in the same way that
treaties are made).
155. See id. at 662 (arguing that treaty denunciation is indistinguishable from any other
unilateral acts the president legally commits, such as “recognition of new states and
governments”).
156. Cf. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 251 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(“The Court frustrates settled expectations by rewriting the [congressionally approved]
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which create expectations of individual liberties or freedoms, might
also be subject to an estoppel-style argument.
Even the executive branch has, on at least one occasion, adhered
to the belief that once rights are created and vest, a president does
not have the authority to revoke them. In an opinion on the subject of
whether an act “within the jurisdiction of the President” could be
revised by a successor, Attorney General Caleb Cushing concluded
that President Franklin Pierce did not have “lawful authority to
157
revoke the act of . . . President Polk.” Cushing based his decision on
the principle that if the opposite were true, “there would be no
stability or security for any rights.”158 The “rights” in question related
to a property grant that the government sought to revoke and
reassign to a different party. If property rights acquired under color of
law cannot be revoked, then recognized human rights, which arguably
are more fundamental for “stability,” should be accorded similar, if
not greater, protection.159
160
Although Goldwater v. Carter can be read as tacitly approving
unilateral termination, its application is limited. The Court relied on
161
the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the case’s merits,
but under the approach outlined in this Note, the Court could have
concluded that termination of only certain types of treaties presented
a nonjusticiable question. Instead, members of the Court declared
that no “judicially manageable” standards existed because “different
termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties.”162
The one Justice who would have reached the merits implied that the
president did have unilateral abrogation power—but hinted that such

Compact [between Oklahoma and New Mexico] to mean something other than what its
language says.”).
157. Power of the President, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 606 (1854).
158. Id.
159. This example is not intended as an authoritative statement about whether a former
president’s actions can bind a sitting president.
160. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
161. Id. at 1003–04 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and
Stevens, J.).
162. Id. In this sense, these Justices affirmed the lower court’s statement that “[t]here is no
judicially ascertainable . . . method of making any distinction among treaties on the basis of their
substance. . . . [and] no standards to apply in making such distinctions.” Goldwater v. Carter,
617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated by 444 U.S. at 996.
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power might have been limited (or limitable, if the Court had dared
163
to act) to certain categories of treaties.
To date, no alleged or actual unilateral terminations have dealt
with a human rights treaty. Of the nine examples of unilateral
presidential terminations cited by one scholar, all but one dealt with
164
commerce-related issues; the other related to national defense.
Thus, neither judicial nor executive branch precedent, construed even
on the most generous terms, supports unilateral termination of
human rights treaties.
B. How Activist Courts Can Protect Human Rights
So, if treaties can be classified by subject, at least to the extent
that human rights treaties can be distinguished from others as to
overcome the political question hurdle, and if such treaties confer
individual rights that are coequal with constitutional rights, why is the
Court hesitant to restrain the executive? The Court may be hesitant
to intervene, not because there is no manageable standard by which
to classify treaties, but because the president asserts executive
authority to terminate a treaty unilaterally—for example, by claiming
executive branch responsibility for national security.165 Yet, as
Professor Glennon wrote, the Court has never explicitly upheld the

163. See 444 U.S. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Abrogation of the defense treaty
with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government . . . .
Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to
recognize . . . foreign regimes.”). But see GLENNON, supra note 13, at 150, 158 (arguing that
there is no reason why termination of a mutual defense treaty should be treated differently from
another kind of treaty, but suggesting that some treaties may not be terminable, such as the
U.N. Charter).
164. See ADLER, supra note 138, at 181–90 (delineating treaties claimed to have been
unilaterally terminated by the president). Since Professor Adler’s book was published, one
other appellate case dealing with unilateral treaty termination might be added to the tally:
President George W. Bush’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty. The challenge
brought by several members of Congress to protest the decision resulted in another court
“decision” rendering the issue nonjusticiable, relying on Goldwater. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (describing the ABM treaty as involving “national defense
considerations”); see also Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1199 (D. Mass.
1986) (finding a challenge to an embargo imposed by the president on trade with Nicaragua
nonjusticiable based on Goldwater, but emphasizing that adjudication would be helpful to
determine what redress, if any, injured private individuals have when a treaty is terminated).
165. See Powell, supra note 137, at 555, 556, 564 (outlining and describing the five general
categories of presidential powers, including national security).
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president’s right to terminate a treaty “on the basis of his sole
166
judgment” that a treaty no longer serves a national security interest.
Perhaps, then, the Court wants to avoid a mere difference of
opinion. One of the justifications for the Bush administration’s
strained definition of torture was that there was no international
consensus regarding the degree of suffering required to constitute
167
torture. But, if the Convention merely codified international law
and neither defined the offense nor legislated its prohibition, the
Court surely would be able to ascertain some definition of what
constitutes torture. After all, one Justice famously remarked,
regarding obscenity, that he knew it when he saw it; surely torture,
however difficult to define, is equally recognizable in the majority of
cases.168 And, if the Bush administration’s definition conflicted with
the commonly understood definition of torture, construing a human
rights treaty as vesting individual rights would provide the Court with
a clear rationale for rejecting the administration’s definition. As the
arbiter of the meaning of constitutional rights, the judicial branch,
and not the executive, should bear responsibility for, and assert
authority over, the interpretation of human rights treaties.169
The Bush administration also claimed that a defense of
“necessity” justified contravening not just the Convention Against
170
Torture, but also relevant domestic legislation. But the Convention
itself indicates that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . .
171
may be invoked as a justification of torture.” The Court should feel
empowered to rely on the status of torture as a jus cogens norm and

166. GLENNON, supra note 13, at 149.
167. See Standards of Conduct for Interrogation, supra note 3, at 19–20 (citing Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Mark Richard’s testimony at the Senate ratification hearing on the
Convention Against Torture that no such consensus existed).
168. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
169. Although the federal torture statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2004),
criminalizes torture only outside the United States, the Convention Against Torture cannot be
reasonably understood to permit torture committed by a government against its own people. If
a human rights treaty is to mean anything, especially in the context of vesting constitutional
rights, it must be understood as conferring protections domestically at least as great as those
granted to individuals residing outside U.S. territory. Compare Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani,
33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that there are no reported cases recognizing a
cause of action under any jus cogens norm for acts committed by U.S. government officials
against U.S. citizens), with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
the court knows of “no assertion by any contemporary state of a right to torture its own . . .
citizens”).
170. Standards of Conduct for Interrogation, supra note 3, at 39.
171. Convention Against Torture, supra note 2, art. 2(2).
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to reject any definition that derogates from it, even one proposed by
the executive, to the degree required to protect such a norm’s
172
The Court would be acting
“penumbras and emanations.”
consistently with its own precedent and could neatly avoid the
political question doctrine by pointing to controlling authority, such
as treaties, customs, and other sources of international law, giving it
the kind of judicially manageable standard found lacking in
Goldwater. Such an approach would give the Court a legitimate
reason to supersede either political branch’s opinion while
simultaneously avoiding accusations of ideological or political bias.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has opted for none of these
approaches to date. In 2004, in fact, it declined to interpret and apply
international human rights law, accepting the Senate’s declaration
that the ICCPR is non-self-executing and therefore does not confer
173
any individual rights. Fortunately, the Court did not entirely close
the door to such an approach. It merely insisted that “any claim based
on the present-day law of nations . . . rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of . . . 18th-century
paradigms”174 and noted that “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
175
doorkeeping” and “independent judicial recognition of actionable
international norms.”176
A decision that human rights treaties, because of their unique
nature and function, should be treated differently from other treaties,
and specifically that jus cogens norms deserve special status, would
allow the Court to constrain the executive without raising the fear of
an out-of-control judiciary.
CONCLUSION
Understandings of both treaties and rights have evolved since the
United States was founded. Foreign relations is indisputably more
complex than it was in the eighteenth century; as a result, the nature

172. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, art. 53; see Lobel, supra note
147, at 1138 (explaining Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the
United States accepts as binding even though it has not been ratified).
173. Sosa v. Alvarez-Martin, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
174. Id. at 725.
175. Id. at 729.
176. Id. But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[C]ourts must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists . . . today.”).
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and purposes of treaties have changed. Similarly, conceptions of
sovereignty have changed, and notions about individual rights, so
revolutionary when asserted in the Declaration of Independence,
have become established and have expanded to encompass areas of
human activity the Framers would never have anticipated. And
although positivists can question whether states practice what they
preach, at least normatively, certain practices are no longer accepted,
such as slavery, genocide, and apartheid. Such developments are
unquestionably “advances.”
In a world in which a U.S. president might assert the need for
extraordinary powers to face new and uncertain threats to domestic
tranquility and national security, the Supreme Court should rely more
heavily on international law than it has in the past to restrain further
aggrandizement of presidential power. Doing so would be entirely
consistent with judicial precedent because international law has
always been part of American law. Nor should the Court fear to look
beyond written texts to discern the content and scope of international
law. Treaties often neither define nor create the law, especially when
such treaties deal with human rights and behavioral norms about
which consensus has already been achieved.
When a clear standard exists for adjudicating deviations from
international norms or treaty obligations, the Court should not throw
its hands up and seek refuge under the shelter of the political
question doctrine. Quite the contrary. After all, in Chief Justice
Marshall’s words, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”177 Faced with such a case,
the Court should step in to contravene presidential action contrary to
a peremptory norm.

177.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

